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Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are proliferating throughout the world, with 
some nations gaining the potential to launch them from submarines.  The long range of 
these missiles implies that the submarine would rely on target detections from other 
forces.  Communication delays and accuracy of locating data influence shot accuracy. 
This thesis uses a maneuvering target statistical tracker model (MTST) of target 
motion and indicates that the submarine can conduct an effective launch with accurate 
locating information even with long communications delays.  The analysis shows that 
significant degradation of the probability of target intercept occurs for an alerted or 
evading target. 
The analysis then determines how this is affected by the presence of other 
potential targets for the missile.  Two assumptions are made about the performance of the 
ASCM seeker.  A simplistic seeker that selects a target at random performs very poorly if 
other naval escorts and random neutral shipping are encountered.  A more intelligent 
seeker that uses information about the relative size of the ships and attacks the largest one 









































The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
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Many maritime nations are procuring Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) for use 
in an anti-access strategy.  These missiles can be obtained relatively cheaply from 
international arms exporting nations.  The acquisition of these missiles is intended to 
prevent the U.S. from bringing its maritime power projection capability within operating 
range of the coastline. 
Sophisticated long-range ASCMs may be useful in an anti-access strategy, if 
employed effectively.  However, the use at long ranges implies that the launching 
platform will not detect and locate the target itself.  This detection is accomplished by 
other platforms, which then relay the information to the submarine. 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of a long-range ASCM attack from a 
submarine with respect to accuracy and timeliness of targeting information provided.  A 
Java program using a Maneuvering Target Statistical Tracker (MTST) model is used to 
evaluate the uncertainty in target position for the missile attempting to intercept the 
target. 
Results show that the missile easily intercepts a non-alerted target with reasonable 
targeting precision at even long communication delays.  However, a target that suspects a 
possible ASCM threat can significantly lower the risk simply by operating at a higher 
speed.  Detecting and evading optimally at launch time further reduces the probability of 
missile intercept. 
The missile attack scenario is extended to investigate the probability of hitting the 
intended target in the presence of interfering contacts.  Two types of missile seeker logic 
are examined, showing that the performance of ASCMs with simple seeker rules is 
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I. ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES IN AN ANTI-ACCESS ROLE  
There is a strong temptation to ensure against surprise by assuming the 
most of enemy capabilities.  Certainly past underestimates have sometimes 
been extremely embarrassing, as in the case of Japan in 1941.  However, 
overestimates may well deter us from actions that are clearly in our 
interests [Friedman, 2001]. 
 
A. ANTI-ACCESS STRATEGY 
An important feature of globalization and the rise of regional military powers is 
the development of an anti-access strategy to counter the U.S. Navy power projection 
capability [Murdock, 2002].  In a region where the U.S. may not have basing rights or a 
developed coalition of regional partners, the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) would become the focus of conventional power 
projection capability for the US.  They would bring carrier based strike aircraft, 
Tomahawk cruise missiles and amphibious assault capability to project power against an 
adversary of the U.S. 
Preventing the U.S. from using these mobile bases of power projection is the key 
feature of an anti-access strategy.  The adversary would desire to force the U.S. to remain 
outside of engagement range of the carrier air wing and cruise missiles and to create an 
environment that prohibits the landing of amphibious forces from the ESG.  The U.S. 
forces would be required to neutralize the anti-access weapons prior to closing to 
engagement range or face much higher risks to their naval forces during an engagement. 
 
B. ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE (ASCM) ROLE AND PROLIFERATION 
ASCMs would be useful in an anti-access scenario due to the ability to attack at 
long range and their relative economy.  Although U.S. versions cost upwards of 
$1Million, many produced by China and Russia can be purchased for less than $400,000 
per unit [Bolkcom, 2002]. 
There is also the perception that these weapon systems do not require the same 
level of training and sophistication to employ as more conventional naval weapons such 
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as torpedoes or strike aircraft.  Most nations that would consider ASCMs as a centerpiece 
of their anti-access strategy would not have the tactical sophistication to maintain highly 
trained crews needed to go against the U.S. in a submarine or strike aircraft.  So, the 
simpler method of using missiles is attractive. 
The utility of ASCMs to second tier military nations was brought home by the 
sinking of the HMS Sheffield and the damaging of the USS Stark, both by French made 
Exocet missiles. 
More than a dozen nations have purchased ASCMs for use in access denial 
scenarios.  Many of them have submarine launched variants [Barber, 2001].  The spread 
of these missiles is difficult to challenge due to the overlap of missile technologies with 
manned aircraft technologies in the current arms control agreements (the Missile 
Technology Control Regimes and the Wassenaar Agreement) [Bolkcom, 2002]. 
Submarine launched ASCMs have a distinct advantage for the attacker in that 
other platforms are much easier to detect, locate and eliminate before the CSG or ESG 
comes into range for attack.  Land based sites are subject to detection from satellite 
imaging and surface ships from maritime long-range radar surveillance.  However, 
submarines have the advantage of avoiding these detection tactics. 
 
C. CHALLENGES IN ASCM USE 
There are several operational challenges for a nation to overcome to effectively 
use submarine based ASCMs against the USN.  These are often neglected in the analysis 
of the missiles, as technical, engineering capabilities such as maximum range, radar 
parameters and warhead type/size are often the focus of the analysis.   
 
D. OVERALL SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST TARGET  
There is a danger in ignoring the total system nature of weapon systems.  A major 
focus for many analyses is on terminal capabilities of weapons [Freidman, 2001].  
However, this type of analysis ignores the difficulty of detection, localization, 
classification and identification of the target.  Other analyses deal with the ASCM in the 
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presence of the ships integrated defense systems.  The mere possession of ASCM systems 
does not imply that they will be effective in an anti-access mission [Barber, 2001].   
Using submarines as launch platforms for ASCMs gives the attacker an 
advantage.  The ESG/CSG has a much more difficult problem detecting and eliminating 
the launch platform.   
However, submarines launching long range ASCMs at near their maximum range 
will not detect or hold the target on any shipboard sensor.  The submarine relies on other 
ships or aircraft to communicate contact information to it, possibly through a command 
headquarters.  Additionally, submarines are generally operated in a mode that makes 
communication with them less rapid than with surface vessels.  This can be a delay due to 
communication throughput or due to simply having to alert a submarine to establish 
communications or wait for a pre-determined communication period.  Figure 1 shows 
that this delay can complicate their use as an ASCM launching platform because the 
uncertainty in the position of the target expands due to the uncertainty in movement of 
ships at sea. 
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Figure 1.   Initial position uncertainty expands after time delay.  Depicts a 
containment curve contour.  Orientation of ellipse depends on positional 
uncertainty, not observed velocity or velocity uncertainty. 
 
E. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
This thesis tries to estimate the degree of competency required of an adversary to 
use ASCMs effectively to become a credible threat to the U.S.  The question of missiles 
fired at long range, certainly beyond the sensor horizon of the firing platform is 
examined.  The main parameters in question are the locating accuracy required and the 
timeliness of that data provided to the shooter.  Immediate use of grossly inaccurate 
location data would likely be useless.  Alternatively, highly accurate position information 
provided too late would also be ineffective.  Examining the interplay of these two major 
factors can advise the U.S. as to our vulnerability to the potential threat of ASCMs 
launched from submarines, and may lead to insights to lessen that vulnerability. 
This thesis uses the form of Kalman filter called Maneuvering Target Statistical 
Tracker (MTST) to estimate the location of the target vessel.  One characteristic of the 
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MTST is that the area of uncertainty in position expands over time and this allows us to 
accurately estimate the probability of missile intercept.  A straight running missile that 
activates a seeker and sweeps out a volume of probability mass under the MTST bivariate 
normal approximation is proposed.  This bivariate normal is rotated to the reference 
frame of the missile path and determining the cumulative distribution function of a 
univariate normal produces an estimated probability of hit.  The procedure is run many 
times with different degrees of accuracy and timeliness of data to develop an insight into 
the important factors in the parameter space. 
Different target postures are assumed in the analysis.  The worst-case assumption 
is for a non-alerted target that is attacked and doesn’t detect the attack.  This assumption 
is compared to one where the target moves at higher speeds to make the targeting 
problem more difficult.  Finally, the case where the target is assumed to detect the launch 
of the missile and is capable of evading optimally is examined to determine how this 





























A. MANEUVERING TARGET STATISTICAL TRACKER (MTST) 
A special type of Kalman filter called Maneuvering Target Statistical Tracker 
(MTST) is used to estimate the position uncertainty of the target.  The general 
formulation from Washburn is adopted here for the MTST Kalman filter [Washburn 
2004].  The state of the target X (x, y position and velocities of the target), is an unknown 



















Here X ~ N(µ,!) , which means that X is distributed as a multivariate normal 
with mean µ  and covariance matrix ! .  Our goal is to obtain the best estimate of the 
position portion of this !  matrix (the upper left quadrant of the 4x4 matrix) and use this 
to determine how well the submarine launched ASCM would do in intercepting the 
target. 
An estimate µ of the state vector is created based on measurements of the target, 
Z = HX +V .  In this model the transformation matrix H is a 4x4 identity matrix and 
V ~ N(µ
V
,R)  is the measurement noise.  For this model µ
V
= 0 , which means that the 
measurements have no systematic biases.  The covariance of the measurements of 












































In this model for R , the position estimates are allowed to have a non-zero 
covariance.  That means that the ellipse may have an orientation that is not just along the 
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x or y-axis.  The velocity errors are assumed to be independent of the position errors, as 
well as each other. 
In other models H  may take on different forms.  For example, the position and 
velocity of a target is frequently determined by repetitive observations of just the 
position, and H  then takes on a different form in the MTST implementation.   







"1    (1) 
Then the state estimate and covariance matrix are updated: 
µ+ = µ! + K(Z ! µ
V
! Hµ! )    (2) 
!
+
= (I " KH )!
"     (3) 
The target is assumed to move in accordance with an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process, which is integrated to give the basis for the motion portion of the MTST model.  
In the O-U process, mean velocity is zero over the long run, and the movement matrix !  
is given by: 
! =
1 0 " 0
0 1 0 "
0 0 c 0














The parameters of the movement matrix are given by c = e!(" /# )  and ! = " (1# c) , 
where ! is the time interval of concern (measurement time and missile intercept time) 
and !  is the relaxation time for velocity (roughly the time interval between which 
velocities are assumed independent). 



























































(1! c) .  The Q  
matrix has the effect of inflating the uncertainty of the estimated state of the target by: 
!(t + ") = #!(t)#
T
+Q    (4) 
The state estimate after a time interval is given by: 
µ(t + !) = "µ(t) + µ
W
   (5) 
Here µ
W
= 0 , i.e. the target has no overall movement direction. 
Here one measurement of target position and velocity is made, and then the 
estimate degrades over time due to the IOU process.  Even if more than one measurement 
is made on the target prior to the decision to attack with an ASCM, the effect on the 
model is the same.  While the data is being sent from the command center to the attacking 




1. Single Simple Missile 
This analysis looks at a single high subsonic sea-skimming missile fired from 
maximum range of 80 nm.  This long range carries with it the assumption that the 
submarine does not hold the target on any of its sensors. 
The missile proceeds down the optimum bearing to sweep out the center of the 
target AOU.  The missile will detect and home on the target with certainty if it is within 
the missile sweep width. 
2. Finite Horizon 
The missile type analyzed here is a sea skimming type, most common for 
ASCMs, and thus has a limited horizon.  The lateral range swept out by the missile is 
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derived from the radar horizon and the assumption that the missile radar looks in a 90-
degree forward scan +/- 45 degrees.  The radar horizon formula gives a good 
approximation of the assumed sweep width of the missile [after Wagner et. al., 1999]. 
 
sweep width(nm) = 2 * cos(45
!
) *1.21* ( missile h( ft) + ship h( ft)  )  
Here the missile is proposed to have an altitude of 30 ft.  Most ASCMs are 
employed in a sea-skimming mode, using a radar altimeter at altitudes about ten meters 
[Bolkcom, 2002b]. 
3. Submarine Navigation Error 
Firing a missile from one moving platform at another moving platform requires 
knowledge of the location of both the launcher and the target.  The submarine’s own 
navigation error can be estimated separately, be assumed to be zero or added onto the 
targets location error.  In this model the submarine comes to shallow depth during 
communications to receive the targeting information or during launch.  During this 
shallow depth period the submarine can receive navigation updates via Global 
Positioning System (GPS).  Therefore submarine location error is small and is included in 
the target location error terms. 
 
C. JAVA PROGRAM DESIGN 
The Java program ASCM_MTST is organized into five important methods. 
• main method 
• setParams method 
• measurementUpdate method 
• movementUpdate method 
• integrate method 
1. Program main Method 
The main method is the portion of the program that starts the program running.  
An object of the ASCM_MTST class is instantiated and then the data is read into the 
program. 
Data is entered via command line arguments to the ASCM_MTST.class Java 
Program as in Table 1, below.  The program requires all nine to be strings separated by 
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spaces immediately following the program execution command.  The program then 
parses these strings into the numerical values that set the key parameters of the missile-
firing model.  Without command line arguments, the ASCM_MTST program will prompt 
for the user to enter the required parameters.  
 
Command line arguments  
s rms velocity of target (kts)  
delta time delay until launch (min)  
tau relaxation time (min)  
sigA ellipse major axis std dev (nm) 
sigRatio ratio of minor axis: major axis  
alpha angle of ellipse (degrees CCW from X-axis) 
sigUxUy std dev of velocity measurements (kts) 
u observed speed of target (kts)  
phi observed course of target (degrees CCW from X-axis) 
Table 1. ASCM_MTST Java program command line arguments (in order) 
 
Following the data input, the main method then invokes the remaining methods of 
the program to complete the model run. 
2. Program setParams Method 
The setParams method manipulates all of the input parameters to transform them 
into values useful to the program.  Values that the user inputs as minutes are adjusted into 
hours.  The matrices in the MTST model are instantiated and values populated from the 
above formulations. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) JAMA Matrix Package 
version 1.0.1 is used for matrix manipulation in the Java program [NIST, 2005].  This 
package was chosen for its accuracy, flexibility and brevity of method calls. 
One example of transformation of input data is the population of the R  matrix.  
The user input for the position measurement errors are the ellipse major axis standard 
deviation (sigA), the “circularity” in percentage or 1 – eccentricity as a percentage 
(sigRatio) and the rotation angle of the ellipse (alpha).  These are more natural to 
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3. Program measurementUpdate and movementUpdate Methods 
The measurementUpdate method takes the input data and changes the original 
poor guess of the state estimate µ  and the covariance matrix !  based upon equations (1) 
– (3) above. 
The movementUpdate method likewise alters µ  and !  as time and the motion of 
the target degrade the information obtained from the measurement. 
4. Program integrate Method 
The spatial uncertainty of the target location at the time of cruise missile intercept 
is a Cartesian bivariate normal !
POS
, which is found as the upper left sub matrix of ! .  
The optimum path of the missile is through the center of this distribution.  The orientation 
of the center is then calculated and the upper quadrant of the MTST covariance matrix is 
rotated to the frame of reference of the missile to allow simple integration over the width 








































This rotation orients the missile flight path along the x-axis and the lower right 
element in !
Rotated
 covariance matrix is used as the variance across the missile sweep 
width.  This is integrated about the missile sweep width by a call to a static method in 
CDF_Normal.class [FPL Statistic Group, 2005.].  This method is based on an accepted 
algorithm [Hart, 1968] and was validated to four significant digits to a published table 
[Devore, 2004]. 
The only output is the calculated probability of missile interception of the target.  
This output is either displayed via standard screen output via command line or to the text 
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file.  The outputs of sequential executions of the program are redirected into a text file for 
data processing. 
 
D. LIMITATIONS AND WEAKNESSES OF MODEL 
1. Motion Model 
An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process provides the model for the motion of the target.  
This integrates an independent N-S and E-W velocities that vary independently about 
zero, giving the target motion the nature of a random walk.  This model is well suited to 
ship motion where the assumption holds that the ship will remain in a fixed area over the 
period of concern. 
2. Normal Velocity Errors 
The MTST model requires that all measurement errors be normally distributed.  
This assumption is can be reasonable for position measurement errors.  However, there 
may be problems with velocity measurements. 
Visual estimations of ship courses and speeds will likely not result in independent 
velocity component errors.  The speed estimate may be normal, and the course estimate 
may be normal as well.  But, the N-S and E-W components of velocity errors would 
come from the product of the speed estimate and the sine or cosine of the course estimate.  
This would not usually yield independent normal errors. 
3. Simplistic Engagement 
This analysis is for a single missile fired against a single ship.  In an anti-access 
scenario, multiple ships would be operating together in the CSG or ESG.  Determining 
which target, among many is the intended one is the function of missile logic and is not 
covered in this thesis.  This thesis makes an optimistic assumption on the side of the 
attacker that the missile will perfectly determine its intended target, if it is inside its 


































A. NON-ALERTED TARGET 
A non-alerted target will normally be moving around its area of operations at 
moderate speed.  The two main factors of location error and time delay are varied across 
a range of possible values in this design.  Time delay of the measurement to missile 
launch is varied from 10min to 100min in 5min increments.  The low end of this is a 
minimum time from detection to launch, assuming a near immediate response by the 
command center to authorize missile launch and also a near zero communication delay to 
provide the data to the submarine.  The high end of the scale is to provide a large enough 
value to determine behavior at an extremely long decision and communication cycle. 
For position error, a circular error is assumed from 1 nm to 20 nm standard 
deviation.  Although it is quite possible in the age of Global Positioning System (GPS) 
navigation systems to obtain positions with accuracy well under 1 nm, this variable also 
contains the internal submarine navigation error as discussed above as well as any other 
positional data errors such as datum errors and translation errors across command and 
control systems.  All other parameters are held constant at representative levels as shown 
below in Table 2. 
 
Non-alerted target parameters 
description program name value type 
target rms speed s (kts) 12 held constant 
time delay until launch delta (min) 10-100 varied 19 steps 
relaxation time tau (min) 30 held constant 
ellipse std dev sigA (nm) 1-20 varied 20 steps 
"circularity" sigRatio (%) 100 held constant 
ellipse orientation alpha (degrees) 0 held constant 
target speed std dev sigUxUy (kts) 4 held constant 
observed target speed u (kts) 12 held constant 
observed target course phi (degrees) 45 held constant 
Table 2. Inputs for non-alerted target runs. 
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This provides a grid of 380 distinct missile launch scenarios.  These are executed 
in a batch and collected into an output file.  The probability of intercept of the missile 
against standard deviation and time is displayed as a surface plot in Figure 2.  The same 
data is shown in Figure 3 as a contour plot using the JMP statistical software. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Surface plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 12 knot target 
rms speed. 
 
For a non-alerted target, we see the probability of missile intercept falls off as 
either the initial position uncertainty increases or time delay increases.  Of the two, 
accurate location of the target is preferred to having a short time delay.  With a 1.0 nm 
standard deviation of position error, the attacking force can take up to nearly 50 minutes 
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Figure 3.   Contour plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 12 knot target 
rms speed. 
 
B. ALERTED TARGET 
A similar experiment was run with the target alerted to possible attack by cruise 
missiles.  The target elects to operate at higher speed to make targeting more difficult for 
the attacker.  The nine command line inputs for the program are provided in Table 3.  The 
only changes from the non-alerted case are the assumed rms speed and the measured 




Alerted target parameters 
description program name value type 
target rms speed s (kts) 25 held constant 
time delay until launch delta (min) 10-100 varied 19 steps 
relaxation time tau (min) 30 held constant 
ellipse std dev sigA (nm) 1-20 varied 20 steps 
"circularity" sigRatio (%) 100 held constant 
ellipse orientation alpha (degrees) 0 held constant 
target speed std dev sigUxUy (kts) 4 held constant 
observed target speed u (kts) 25 held constant 
observed target course phi (degrees) 45 held constant 
Table 3. Inputs for alerted target runs. 
 
The shape of the surface plot, Figure 4, is roughly the same as with the non-
alerted target.  However, notice that the probability falls off much more steeply.  If the 
target is aware of possible attack and simply increases speed to 25 kts, the same 1.0 nm 
position error for the target would result in less than a 0.6 probability of missile intercept 
after the same 50 min launch delay.  To keep the 0.9 probability of intercept, the attacker 
has to improve the time delay to less than 25 minutes. 
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Figure 4.   Surface plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 25 knot target 
rms speed. 
 
The contour plot, Figure 5, shows how much the speed increase has the effect of 
compressing the x-axis.  Previously, the submarine had an extremely good chance of the 
missile intercepting the target, even at long time delays, as long as the data provided to it 
was accurate.  Here, even with good quality data, the attacker needs to act quickly as their 
advantage degrades with time. 
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Figure 5.   Contour plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 25 knot target 
rms speed. 
 
C. EVADING TARGET 
The CSG or ESG operating in the vicinity of a hostile maritime opponent would 
likely have aircraft involved in maritime surveillance.  These maritime patrol aircraft 
operating radars may have the ability to provide an early warning to the target to allow it 
to attempt to evade the ASCM launch.  If we give these aircraft the capability to detect 
the launch of the missile, we can assume that the ship will evade at high speed optimally 
to maximize the distance moved from its location at the time of the missile launch as 
shown in Figure 6. 
After the missile launch, during the time of evasion, the uncertainty in position 
due to the delay is paused during the flight time of the missile.  This is because when the 
21 
target detects the missile launch and evades, the random walk nature of the velocity 
model for MTST are no longer valid. 
 
Figure 6.   Optimal evasion for target. 
 
For a missile detected at launch at a range of 80 nm, with a speed of 0.85 Mach 
and a target evasion speed of 35 knots, the target could move 4.98 nm off of the track of 
the missile. 
Results of an alerted target experiment with the missile sweep width offset by the 
target evasion distance of 4.98 nm are shown in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7.   Missile sweep width offset due to target detection of missile launch and 
optimal evasion. 
 
The results show significant reduction in the probability of intercept for the 
missile as shown in Figures 8 and 9.  This reduction is largest in the regions of highest 
probability.  The example data point of the 1.0 nm position error missile shot could only 
be delayed by less than 20 minutes to result in the 0.9 probability of intercept. 
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Figure 8.   Surface plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 25 knot target 




Figure 9.   Contour plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 25 knot target 
rms speed that detects the ASCM at launch and evades at 35 knots. 
 
D. ELLIPSE ECCENTRICITY 
The target location error was assumed to be circular in the above experiments, i.e. 
ellipses with zero eccentricity.  The Java program command line argument sigRatio, 
which is defined as 1 - eccentricity (expressed in %) was fixed at 100 for all of the runs.  
This eliminated any influences of particular geometries upon the probability density 
swept out by the missile flight path. 
However, some types of measurements such as time difference of 
arrival/frequency difference of arrival (TDOA/FDOA) or high frequency direction 
finding (HFDF) provide target location AOUs that can be highly eccentric, due to the 
geometry of the detection system and target [Stewart, 1997].   
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Figure 10 shows the results of a 25 knot alerted target fired upon after a 30 minute 
delay.  For the circular location error, the missile has a probability of intercept of 0.54. 
 
Figure 10.   Surface plot of probability of missile intercepting target for 25 knot alerted 
target after a 30 minute delay.  The detection provides an elliptical position error 
with major axis of 10 nm and different eccentricities. 
 
The enhancement above this baseline occurs when the missile flight path proceeds along 
the major axis of the target AOU.  This effect is more pronounced with ellipses with high 
eccentricity (low “circularity”).  Increases in probability of intercept like this are due to 
random geometry of the AOU and firing submarine position.  Due to a submarine’s lack 
of mobility, it would not be able to reposition to take advantage of this phenomenon.  
However, an adversary with multiple launch platforms within missile range could use this 
as a criterion for selecting the platform to attack. 
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E. FALSE TARGETS AND MISSILE SEEKER TYPES 
Previous analysis assumes that the missile will not hit an unintended target.  This 
is either by the target being alone in the ocean or the missile could perfectly discriminate 
the intended target from non-targets.  However, aircraft carriers or large deck amphibious 
ships do not patrol oceans solitarily. 
An extension is to embed the target in a spatial Poisson field of false targets, 
either neutral shipping or escorts of the target.  This would assume that ships are 
randomly distributed and therefore the missile would encounter a random number of false 
targets as it sweeps through the target AOU. 
An estimate of the key parameter for the Poisson process comes from a shipping 
density survey [Naval Ocean Systems Command, 1987].  This gives density of 
merchants, tankers and fishing vessels in the range of 100-300 ships per 105 square nm, 
which gives an approximation of the Poisson parameter, !shipping  as 0.002 ships / square 
nm.  In this anti-access scenario, the location of the attack would be closer to shore than 
this open ocean survey.  Therefore, !shipping  is doubled to 0.004 ships / square nm. 
Added to this must be the fact that the missile would also probably encounter the 
other ships in the CSG or ESG when searching for the target.  Here, we will assume that 
the number of escorts within the seeker window are distributed Poisson with mean 
(!
escorts
) of  five. 
 
1. Dumb Seeker 
A dumb seeker might simply select a target at random, for example the first one 
that it detects within some spatial window.  This would dramatically reduce the 
probability of hitting the intended target. 
Let p0 ! P(missile intercepts target) , which is calculated by MTST_ASCM Java 
program as before.  Then, if N is defined as the number of false targets (neutral shipping 










The model used in MTST_ASCM assumes a 30 ft missile altitude and the ability 
to see ships that are greater than 25 ft in height.  This results in a missile sweep width of 
almost 18 nm.  Using this and a downrange distance of 40 nm with the missile radar on, 



















is approximately 0.127.  Figure 11 shows a surface plot of the resulting phit  for a dumb 
missile shot at an alerted target. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Surface plot of probability of hit phit  for a missile with a dumb seeker 




This type of missile seeker results in an extremely poor hit probability of the 











&  in a spreadsheet shows that nearly 
56% of the time, the missile is homing on other CSG escorts and not the carrier, even 
when the carrier is in the seeker window.  While this is not the intended result, the 
attacking force would still be successful in attacking the CSG.  This may be a satisfying 
result for an attacking force aimed at anti-access goals.  
2. Smarter Seeker 
With the rapid increase of high-speed portable computing power, a missile could 
take advantage of radar return information.  From the range and strength of the radar 
return, a rough measure of radar cross section (RCS) of the contact can be inferred.  A 
smarter missile seeker then selects the contact with the highest observed radar cross 
section. 
Radar cross section is very dependent on the aspect angle of the target, among 
other factors [Wagner et. al., 1999].  We assume that RCS on dB scale is uniformly 
distributed from a maximum value to a minimum value, and aspect angle is random for 
the target and any other ships (including escorts).  Figure 12 illustrates some values for 
the following example.  The target (carrier) generally has a larger RCS than other ships, 
but there are some random orientations that would show a broadside aspect for an escort 
and a narrow one for the target. 
 
Figure 12.   Radar Cross Section (RCS) example values for smarter seeker model. 
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When this overlap is present with 
 




! RCS of shipping/escort i !
iid
 U(Ymin , Ymax ) , then the probability of this seeker hitting 
the target in the presence of n other ships is: 
 
P(target hit) = P(X > Y1 ! X > Y2 !!! X > Yn )  




































































































The missile seeker would only be successful if the observed RCS of the target 
were greater than all of the others encountered by the missile.  The values in this example 
show that the carrier would have only a 94.4% chance of having an observed RCS greater 
than a single smaller ship.  But in the presence of a Poisson field of neutral shipping and 
escorts with mean 7.88, the probability of missile hitting the carrier given that it 
intercepts the carrier is reduced down to 0.776.  Figure 13 shows the results of using this 
model of the seeker behavior. 
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Figure 13.   Surface plot of probability of hit for a missile with a smarter seeker 
attacking a 25 knot alerted target. 
 
This is a reasonable result, as it is not reduced so much that the probability of hit 
is not worth the effort to attack.  However, this does show that to take advantage of the 




IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
A maneuvering target statistical tracker Kalman filter based tracking model is 
used to determine location uncertainty of a moving target in a naval anti-access scenario.  
The attacking nation detects the target, a carrier or large deck amphibious ship and relays 
this information to a submarine.  There is a delay in this communication.  The MTST 
model inflates the original position uncertainty during this delay due to the unknown and 
unobserved motion of the target.  The submarine then launches an ASCM to optimally 
attack the target. 
A Java based program is used to facilitate repetitive analysis of different launch 
configuration.  The analysis focuses on the degree of precision of locating information 
and the timeliness of the ASCM launch. 
A surprise attack of a non-alerted target at moderate speed would have a high 
probability of successful missile interception of the target.  In an anti-access conflict 
scenario, in which the U.S. would likely have suspicion of a potential ASCM attack, the 
use of speed alone degrades the attacker’s chances of success greatly.  In a highly alert, 
defensive posture, a minimal evasion (~ 5nm) during missile flight would also reduce the 
probability of success for the missile firing. 
Two types of missile seekers are modeled.  A simplistic seeker is one that selects 
a target to attack at random from among those it encounters.  This results in a highly inept 
missile in any but the sparsest populated oceans. 
The second seeker type is one that is designed to attack the largest potential target 
presented to it.  Even with this more sophisticated seeker, a significant reduction in 
performance is seen in the presence of even a moderate false target population. 
The defender, in the presence of a potential long range ASCM threat may take 




B. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
1. More Complex Seeker Pattern 
The missile assumed in this thesis is one that makes one sweep down the optimum 
bearing to the target.  There are other ways for a missile seeker to sweep out a target area.  
Most of these are used to avoid homing on false targets.  These more complex patterns 
may be analyzed by simulation with an MTST model for targeting.  
2. Incorporation of Synchronized Missile Salvo 
This analysis is an estimation of the potential of a limited attack.  Multiple 
launches from a single submarine may be used to improve the coverage and to increase 
the complexity of defending the target for the CSG escorts.  
3. Incorporation of Target Defenses 
When interfering shipping is brought into the model, the presence of CSG escorts 
is assumed.  A primary mission of this screen is Anti-Air Warfare, specifically missile 
defense.  Adding the capability for the screen to defend the carrier would improve the 
prospects for the U.S.  This type of analysis could be done by simulation, because many 
of the outcomes would be dependent on the situational geometry. 
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 * File: ASCM_MTST.java 




 * <P> 
 * Maneuvering Target Statistical Tracker class for determining Anti-Ship 
 * Cruise Missile performance using data obtained from non-organic sensors. 
 * Requires user input for parameters in the form of command line arguments 
 * of length nine.    
 * </P> 
 *  
 * @author Paul Parashak 
 */ 
public class ASCM_MTST { 
    //class constants 
     
    // initial values for sigma matrix 
    public static final double POS_SIGMA = 100.0;  
    public static final double SPEED_SIGMA = 12.0; 
    public static final double MISSILE_ALT = 30.0; 
    public static final double TARGET_HOE = 25.0; // effective height of target 
    public static final double MISSILE_SPEED = 562.3; // .85*speed of sound @sl 
    public static final double SUB_X = 80.0; 
    public static final double SUB_Y = 0.0; 
 
    //class variables 
 
    //instance variables 
     
    // half width of missile look for integration 
    protected double width;  
    protected double delta; 
    private double littleDel; 
    // relaxation time 
    protected double tau;  
    private double c; 
    protected double s; 
    private double qOne; 
    private double qTwo; 
    private double qThree; 
    private double sigX; 
    private double sigY; 
    protected double sigUxUy; 
    protected double sigA; 
    private double sigB; 
    protected double alpha; 
    private double rho; 
    // PHI matrix 
    private Matrix phiMatrix;  
    // H matrix 
    private Matrix hMatrix;  
    // Q matrix 
    private Matrix qMatrix;  
    // R matrix 
    private Matrix rMatrix; 
    // Mean of movement matrix noise 
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    private Matrix muW;  
    // Mean of measurement matrix noise 
    private Matrix muV; 
    // Mean target state 
    protected Matrix mu;  
    // Covariance of ship state 
    protected Matrix sigmaMatrix; 
    // Measurement 
    private Matrix z;  
    // Kalman gain matrix 
    private Matrix kalmanGain; 
    // rotation matrix for input and output 
    protected Matrix rotation;  
    private Matrix inputCov; 
    protected double u; 
    protected double phi; 
    protected double sigRatio; 
 
    // class methods 
 
    /** 
     * Print method to shorten the "System.out.println" statements  
     * in the code body. Enhances readability of code. 
     *  
     * @param in 
     * String that will be printed on next line. 
     */ 
    public static void print(String in) { 
        System.out.println(in); 
    } 
 
    //constructor methods 
 
    /** 
     * Constructor method for class. 
     */ 
    public ASCM_MTST() { 
    } 
 
    //instance methods 
 
    /** 
     * Sets all the parameters of the Kalman filter parameters and  
     * matrices for further calculations. 
     */ 
    public void setParams() { 
        delta /= 60.0; 
        delta += SUB_X/MISSILE_SPEED; 
        tau /= 60.0; 
        c = Math.exp(-(delta / tau)); 
        littleDel = tau * (1 - c); 
        q = s * s * (1 - c * c); 
         
        qOne = 0.5 * s * s * tau * (2 * delta - tau * (3 - 4 * c + c * c)); 
        qTwo = 0.5 * Math.pow( (s * Math.sqrt(tau) * (1 - c )), 2); 
        qThree = 0.5 * s * s * (1 - c); 
         
        //set measurment of position and velocity of target 
        z = new Matrix(4, 1); 
        z.set(2,0,u*Math.cos(Math.toRadians(phi))); 
        z.set(3,0,u*Math.sin(Math.toRadians(phi))); 
 
        width = Math.cos(Math.toRadians(45.0)) * 1.21 * (Math.sqrt(MISSILE_ALT)  
          + Math.sqrt(TARGET_HOE)); 
        muV = new Matrix(4, 1); 
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        muW = new Matrix(4, 1); 
 
        mu = new Matrix(4, 1, 100.0); 
 
        //set rho, sigX, sigY 
        alpha = Math.IEEEremainder(alpha, 360); 
 
        alpha = Math.toRadians(alpha); 
 
        inputCov = Matrix.identity(2, 2); 
        inputCov.set(0, 0, sigA * sigA); 
        sigB = sigRatio*sigA/100; 
        inputCov.set(1, 1, sigB * sigB); 
         
        rotation = Matrix.identity(2, 2); 
        rotation.set(0, 0, Math.cos(alpha)); 
        rotation.set(0, 1, -Math.sin(alpha)); 
        rotation.set(1, 0, Math.sin(alpha)); 
        rotation.set(1, 1, Math.cos(alpha)); 
 
        Matrix rotCov = rotation.times(inputCov.times(rotation.transpose())); 
 
        sigX = Math.sqrt(rotCov.get(0, 0)); 
        sigY = Math.sqrt(rotCov.get(1, 1)); 
        rho = rotCov.get(0, 1) / (sigX * sigY); 
 
        sigmaMatrix = Matrix.identity(4, 4); 
        sigmaMatrix.set(0, 0, POS_SIGMA * POS_SIGMA); 
        sigmaMatrix.set(1, 1, POS_SIGMA * POS_SIGMA); 
        sigmaMatrix.set(2, 2, SPEED_SIGMA * SPEED_SIGMA); 
        sigmaMatrix.set(3, 3, SPEED_SIGMA * SPEED_SIGMA); 
 
        hMatrix = Matrix.identity(4, 4); 
 
        rMatrix = Matrix.identity(4, 4); 
        rMatrix.set(0, 0, sigX * sigX); 
        rMatrix.set(0, 1, rho * sigX * sigY); 
        rMatrix.set(1, 1, sigY * sigY); 
        rMatrix.set(1, 0, rho * sigX * sigY); 
        rMatrix.set(2, 2, sigUxUy * sigUxUy); 
        rMatrix.set(3, 3, sigUxUy * sigUxUy); 
 
        phiMatrix = Matrix.identity(4, 4); 
        phiMatrix.set(2, 2, c); 
        phiMatrix.set(3, 3, c); 
        phiMatrix.set(0, 2, littleDel); 
        phiMatrix.set(1, 3, littleDel); 
 
        qMatrix = new Matrix(4, 4); 
        qMatrix.set(0, 0, qOne); 
        qMatrix.set(1, 1, qOne); 
        qMatrix.set(0, 2, qTwo); 
        qMatrix.set(1, 3, qTwo); 
        qMatrix.set(2, 0, qTwo); 
        qMatrix.set(3, 1, qTwo); 
        qMatrix.set(2, 2, qThree); 
        qMatrix.set(3, 3, qThree); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Updates the state estimate and covariance matrices for the initial 
     * measurement matrix. 
     */ 
    public void measurmentUpdate() { 
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        kalmanGain = sigmaMatrix.times(hMatrix.transpose()).times( 
                ((hMatrix.times(sigmaMatrix.times(hMatrix.transpose()))) 
                        .plus(rMatrix)).inverse()); 
        mu.plusEquals(kalmanGain.times(z.minus(muV.minus(hMatrix.times(mu))))); 
        sigmaMatrix = Matrix.identity(4, 4).minus(kalmanGain.times(hMatrix)) 
                .times(sigmaMatrix); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Updates the state estimate for the delay in missile launch and travel 
     * time of the missile to the target. 
     */ 
    public void movementUpdate() { 
        mu = phiMatrix.times(mu).plus(muW); 
 
        sigmaMatrix = phiMatrix.times(sigmaMatrix.times(phiMatrix.transpose())) 
                .plus(qMatrix); 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Calculates the probability that the missile will hit the target. 
     * Initially, the path of the missile through the probability ellipse is 
     * determined and then the upper quadrant (position uncertainty) of the 
     * sigma matrix is put through a rotation transformation. Then a lookup is 
     * done in a 
     */ 
    public void integrate() { 
        double theta = -Math.atan((mu.get(1, 0) - SUB_Y) 
                / (mu.get(0, 0) - SUB_X)); 
 
        Matrix posCov = sigmaMatrix.getMatrix(0, 1, 0, 1); 
        rotation.set(0, 0, Math.cos(theta)); 
        rotation.set(0, 1, -Math.sin(theta)); 
        rotation.set(1, 0, Math.sin(theta)); 
        rotation.set(1, 1, Math.cos(theta)); 
        Matrix ellipse = rotation.times(posCov.times(rotation.transpose())); 
 
        double sigma = Math.sqrt(ellipse.get(1, 1)); 
 
        print(Double.toString(1.0 - 2.0 * CDF_Normal.normp(-width / sigma))); 
 
    } 
 
    //main method 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        ASCM_MTST runIt = new ASCM_MTST(); 
        if (args.length == 9) { 
            try { 
                runIt.s = Double.parseDouble(args[0]); 
                runIt.delta = Double.parseDouble(args[1]); 
                runIt.tau = Double.parseDouble(args[2]); 
                runIt.sigA = Double.parseDouble(args[3]); 
                runIt.sigRatio = Double.parseDouble(args[4]); 
                runIt.alpha = Double.parseDouble(args[5]); 
                runIt.sigUxUy = Double.parseDouble(args[6]); 
                runIt.u = Double.parseDouble(args[7]); 
                runIt.phi = Double.parseDouble(args[8]); 
            }  
            catch (NumberFormatException e) { 
                System.err 
                .println("There was an error in at least one of your inputs."  
                + "\nYou need to input nine doubles separated by spaces." 
                + "\nIn order these should be:" 
                + "\n  s - target rms speed (kts)" 
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                 + "\n  delta - time delay until launch (min)" 
                 + "\n  tau - relaxation time (min)" 
                 + "\n  sigA - position error ellipse major axis std dev (nm)" 
                 + "\n  sigRatio - ratio of major axis : minor axis (%)" 
                 + "\n  alpha - angle of ellipse (degrees CCW from X-axis)" 
                 + "\n  sigUxUy - std dev of velocity measurements (kts)" 
                 + "\n  u - observed speed of target (kts)" 
                 + "\n  phi - observed course of target (degrees CCW from X-
axis)" 
                 + "\n\nPlease correct arguments and run again."); 
            } 
        }  
 
        else { 
            System.err.println("Must have nine arguments for for automatic 
input."); 
        } 
        runIt.setParams(); 
        runIt.measurmentUpdate(); 
        runIt.movementUpdate(); 
        runIt.integrate(); 
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